Single Idea 3002

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique]

Full Idea

Central state identity theorists had trouble providing for the nomological possibility of rational machines (and hence no space for a non-biological, e.g. computational, theory of intelligence).

Clarification

'Nomological' means concerned with rule-following

Gist of Idea

If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought?

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 67)

Book Reference

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'Psychosemantics' [MIT 1993], p.67


A Reaction

I surmise that a more externalist account of the physical mind might do the trick, by explaining intelligence in terms of an evolved relationship between brain and environment.