Full Idea
Once we conceded that Tom can walk slowly or quickly, and that the slowness and quickness is a property of the walking and not of Tom, we can hardly refrain from quantifying over events (such as 'a walking') in our ontology.
Gist of Idea
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist
Source
José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6)
Book Reference
Benardete,José A.: 'Metaphysics: The Logical Approach' [OUP 1989], p.36
A Reaction
What happens when you try to derive metaphysics from logic. We must make the binary choice of quantifying or not over each thing. Why must Tom's fast walk be sliced up, or forced into precise sub-categories? Events overlap, and lack clear boundries.