Full Idea
Davidson's argument about psychophysical anomalism has not been embraced by everyone; multiple realisability of mental properties has had a much greater impact in undermining reductionism (and hence type physicalism).
Clarification
[Because it made the identity of a thought with a type of substance impossible]
Gist of Idea
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was
Source
report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.218
Book Reference
Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.218
A Reaction
My view is that functional states are multiply realisable, but phenomenal states aren't. Fear functions in frogs much as it does in us, but being a frightened frog is nothing like being a frightened human. Their brains are different!