Single Idea 4098

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions]

Full Idea

The theory of descriptions gives a model of internalist intentionality, in that it describes cases where the thinkability of a belief does not depend on the existence of a specific object.

Clarification

The theory spells out the assumptions about existence in a sentence

Gist of Idea

The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent

Source

Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.36)

Book Reference

Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.120


A Reaction

So what do externalists say about the theory? Surely a reference to 'water' can't entail the existence of water?