Single Idea 4617

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties]

Full Idea

A predicate that does not designate a property could nevertheless hold true of an object in virtue of that object's properties. An object is a stone not in virtue of holding the property of being a stone, but because it possesses certain other properties.

Gist of Idea

A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone

Source

John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)

Book Reference

Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.196


A Reaction

Sounds simple but important, especially in relation to the mind. We are left with the problem of how to individuate a property, and the possibility of 'basic' properties.

Related Idea

Idea 9436 The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis]