Single Idea 5053

[catalogued under 14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction]

Full Idea

All the instances which confirm a general truth, however numerous they may be, are not sufficient to establish the universal necessity of this same truth.

Gist of Idea

The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], Pref)

Book Reference

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. Parkinson,G.H.R. [Dent 1973], p.150


A Reaction

This is Leibniz's standardly rationalist view of induction. We can either say that induction is therefore inadequate, or (a better option) that there isn't much evidence for claims of necessity, and they must be treated with caution.