Full Idea
Is the character of being an item of experience one that can accrue to a quale through its relation to other qualia, or must it consist in a relation to a subject, which is conscious of these elements and distinct from them?
Clarification
A 'quale' is a raw feeling, such as the redness of red
Gist of Idea
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject?
Source
A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.B)
Book Reference
Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.118
A Reaction
When nicely put like this, it is hard to see how qualia could be experiences just because they relate to one another. It begs the question of what is causing the relationship. There seems to be a Cogito-like assumption of a thinker.