Full Idea
In 1936 I combined a mentalistic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to oneself with a behaviouristic analysis of the propositions in which one attributes experiences to others.
Clarification
'Mentalistic' views refer to pure consciousness
Gist of Idea
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds
Source
A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], §VI.D)
Book Reference
Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.126
A Reaction
He then criticises his view for inconsistency. Ryle preferred a behaviouristic account of introspection, but Ayer calls this 'ridiculous'. Ayer hunts for a compromise, but then settles for the right answer, which makes mentalism the 'best explanation'.