Full Idea
The eliminativist idealist holds that there is no such thing as a material object; there is nothing but experience (idea, sensation). The reductive idealist holds that there are material objects, but they are nothing other than complexes of experience.
Gist of Idea
Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences
Source
Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.6)
Book Reference
Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.156
A Reaction
Dancy says Berkeley was of the latter type. The distinction doesn't strike me as entirely clear. I can't make much sense of the words 'are' or 'exist' in the second theory. To say it is only experiences translates (to me) as 'doesn't exist'.