Full Idea
It is obvious that a proposition is not the name for a fact, from the mere circumstance that there are two propositions corresponding to each fact, one the negation of the other.
Gist of Idea
Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation
Source
Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §I)
Book Reference
Russell,Bertrand: 'Russell's Logical Atomism', ed/tr. Pears,David [Fontana 1972], p.41
A Reaction
Russell attributes this point to Wittgenstein. Evidently you must add that the proposition is true before it will name a fact - which is bad news for the redundancy view of truth. Couldn't lots of propositions correspond to one fact?
Related Idea
Idea 19164 If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]