Full Idea
The line of reasoning of Kuhn and Feyerabend can be blocked by arguing (as I have in various places, and as Saul Kripke has) that scientific terms are not synonymous with descriptions.
Gist of Idea
The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions
Source
Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec II.2)
Book Reference
Putnam,Hilary: 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' [RKP 1981], p.23
A Reaction
A nice clear statement of the motivation for creating the causal theory of reference. See Idea 6162. We could still go back and ask whether we could block scientific relativism by rethinking how descriptions work, instead of abandoning them.
Related Idea
Idea 6162 Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn]