Full Idea
One correspondence theory (e.g. early Wittgenstein) concerns representations and facts; alternatively (Tarski, Davidson) the category of fact is eschewed, and the truth of sentences or propositions is built out of relations of reference and satisfaction.
Gist of Idea
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction
Source
Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Ch.7.35)
Book Reference
Horwich,Paul: 'Truth (2nd edn)' [OUP 1998], p.104
A Reaction
A helpful distinction. Clearly the notion of a 'fact' is an elusive one ("how many facts are there in this room?"), so it seems quite promising to say that the parts of the sentence correspond, rather than the whole thing.
Related Idea
Idea 17740 Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins]