Single Idea 6351

[catalogued under 11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty]

Full Idea

One of the most important modern advances in epistemology was the recognition of defeasible reasons; it is now generally acknowledged that most of our reasoning proceeds defeasibly rather than deductively.

Gist of Idea

Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively

Source

J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.2)

Book Reference

Pollock,J.L./Cruz,J: 'Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (2nd)' [Rowman and Littlefield 1999], p.10


A Reaction

I agree totally. This is why fallibilism is clearly a correct position in epistemology (e.g. Ideas 2736 and 2755). Deduction is not the only grounds given for certainty - there are rationalist foundations (Descartes) and empiricist foundations (Moore).

Related Ideas

Idea 2736 We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]

Idea 2755 If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J]