Full Idea
Physicalists will, it seems, be committed to the notion of narrow content, because if a person and their counterpart are neurological duplicates, they must exemplify the same mental state types, and thus possess beliefs with the same contents.
Gist of Idea
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states)
Source
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4)
Book Reference
Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.89
A Reaction
Very important. How many philosophers currently believe in both wide content and reductive physicalism? However, if content is physical brain-plus-environment, we might reply that the whole package must be identical for same content. Cf Idea 7884!
Related Idea
Idea 7884 Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau]