Full Idea
We learned from Goodman's problem that with strange enough predicates anything could be made out to be a regularity.
Clarification
'Predicates' attribute properties to objects
Gist of Idea
With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity
Source
Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.8)
Book Reference
Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.239
A Reaction
For Goodman's problem, see Idea 4783. The point, as I see it, is that while predicates can be applied arbitrarily (because they are just linguistic), properties cannot, because they are features of the world. Emeralds are green.
Related Idea
Idea 4783 Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG]