Single Idea 6885

[catalogued under 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals]

Full Idea

Another view of counterfactuals (Lewis, Pollock, Stalnaker) is that they are true if at every possible world at which it is the case that p, and which is otherwise as similar as possible to the actual world, it is also the case that q.

Gist of Idea

Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case

Source

Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.114)

Book Reference

Mautner,Thomas: 'Dictionary of Philosophy' [Penguin 1997], p.114


A Reaction

This seems a good way if putting if, like Lewis, you actually believe in the reality of possible worlds, because then you are saying a counterfactual is made true by a set of facts. Otherwise it is not clear what the truth-maker is here.