Full Idea
'Centralists' (e.g. Bernard Williams) say thin ethical concepts (right, good, ought) are conceptually fundamental; 'non-centralists' (e.g. Susan Hurley) say that such concepts are not conceptually prior to kindness, equity and the like.
Gist of Idea
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.?
Source
Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5)
Book Reference
Jackson,Frank: 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' [OUP 2000], p.136
A Reaction
My immediate intuition is to side with Susan Hurley, since morality grows out of immediate relationships, not out of intellectual principles and theoretical generalisations. This would go with particularist views of virtue theory.