Single Idea 7311

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated]

Full Idea

In all knowledge that can be expressed in words - with the exception of "this" and "that", and a few other such words - no genuine proper names occur, but what seem like genuine proper names are really descriptions

Gist of Idea

The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that'

Source

Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI)

Book Reference

Russell,Bertrand: 'Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy' [George Allen and Unwin 1975], p.178


A Reaction

This is the terminus of Russell's train of thought about descriptions. Suppose you point to something non-existent, like a ghost in a misty churchyard? You'd be back to the original problem of naming a non-existent!