Single Idea 7429

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism]

Full Idea

I speak of my view as the Causal version of functionalism, which asserts that mental states are states apt for the production of certain ranges of behaviour and, in some cases, apt for being produced by certain ranges of stimuli.

Gist of Idea

Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour

Source

David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xiv)

Book Reference

Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-10


A Reaction

This effectively makes a mental state a place in a flowdiagram (and hence the mind is software). It says nothing about what qualities the mental states have which make them apt for this role. Full explanations need more than the function.