Single Idea 7431

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind]

Full Idea

Granted the contingency of the laws of nature, the identification of dispositions with their categorical bases can be contingent only.

Clarification

Their 'categorical bases' are (roughly) their properties

Gist of Idea

The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent

Source

David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xvi)

Book Reference

Armstrong,D.M.: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind' [Routledge 1993], p.-8


A Reaction

Personally I am not willing to grant the contingency of the laws of nature, but I suppose Armstrong is right about identity if he is right about laws. Presumably an identity could happen to be invariant across possible worlds, without being necessary.