Full Idea
Conventional modal semantics, in which all logically possible worlds are defined in terms of maximally consistent proposition sets, has no choice except to allow that the actual world is the world we experience in sensation, or that we inhabit.
Gist of Idea
We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions
Source
Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 9)
Book Reference
Jacquette,Dale: 'Ontology' [Acumen 2002], p.79
A Reaction
Jacquette dislikes this because he is seeking an account of ontology that doesn't, as so often, merely reduce to epistemology (e.g. Berkeley). See Idea 7691 for his preferred account.
Related Idea
Idea 7691 The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]