Full Idea
If causes are basic particulars, then the causal argument won't carry you to the identity of conscious and physical properties, since this only requires them to be instantiated in the same particular, not that the properties are themselves identical.
Gist of Idea
If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical
Source
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.3)
Book Reference
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.19
A Reaction
[See Idea 7857; Papineau is rejecting the Davidson view] This explains how Davidson reaches a token-token identity view. Can two events occur in the same particular at the same moment? Depends what you mean by a 'particular'.
Related Idea
Idea 7857 Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau]