Full Idea
We cannot give materialist explanations of why brain yields phenomenal properties because phenomenal concepts are not associated with descriptions of causal roles in the same way as pre-theoretical terms in other areas of science.
Gist of Idea
Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles
Source
comment on Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1
Book Reference
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.143
A Reaction
I think Papineau has part of the answer, and I certainly like his notion of Conceptual Dualism, but if qualia are physical, there must be a physical account of how they acquire their properties. I think the whole brain needs to be understood first.