Full Idea
A statement of the form 'that is red or orange', said of something on the borderline between the two colours, might rank as true, although neither 'that is red' nor 'that is orange' was true.
Gist of Idea
'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not
Source
Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 5)
Book Reference
Dummett,Michael: 'Thought and Reality (Gifford Lectures)' [OUP 2006], p.64
A Reaction
It seems to me that the problem here would be epistemological rather than ontological. One of the two is clearly true, but sometimes we can't decide which. How can anyone say 'It isn't red and it isn't orange, but it is either red or orange'?