Full Idea
Nothing purely within the theory of meaning is capable of telling us which of two sentences which are paraphrases of one another more accurately reflects the ontological commitments of those who utter them.
Gist of Idea
How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea?
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3)
Book Reference
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.35
A Reaction
This is an attack on the semantic approach to ontology, associated with Quine. Cf. Idea 7923. I have always had an aversion to that approach, and received opinion is beginning to agree. "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio..."
Related Idea
Idea 7923 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C]