Full Idea
The temporal parts approach to identity appears to be viciously circular, for how are the 'temporal parts' of tomatoes to be individuated and identified save by reference to the very tomatoes of which they are parts?
Gist of Idea
How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes?
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 5.3)
Book Reference
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.115
A Reaction
(This attacks the 'perdurance' view - Idea 8271) Something wrong here. Isn't Lowe begging the question, by assuming that a tomato at an instant IS the tomato? To know what a tomato is, you must spend time with it.
Related Idea
Idea 8271 An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe]