Full Idea
If facts are 'proposition-like' or 'thinkable' (we speak of 'knowing' or 'understanding' facts) might they not simply be true propositions?
Gist of Idea
Maybe facts are just true propositions
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2)
Book Reference
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.234
A Reaction
They certainly can't be if we are going to use facts as what makes propositions true. The proposal would be empty without out some other account of truth (probably a dubious one). Facts are truth-makers?
Related Idea
Idea 14778 Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]