Full Idea
Structuralists disagree over whether objects in structures are 'ante rem' (before reality, existing independently of whether the objects exist) or 'in re' (in reality, grounded in the real world, usually in our theories of physics).
Gist of Idea
Are structures 'ante rem' (before reality), or are they 'in re' (grounded in physics)?
Source
Michèle Friend (Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics [2007], 4.4)
Book Reference
Friend,Michèle: 'Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics' [Acumen 2007], p.90
A Reaction
Shapiro holds the first view, Hellman and Resnik the second. The first view sounds too platonist and ontologically extravagant; the second sounds too contingent and limited. The correct account is somewhere in abstractions from the real.