Full Idea
Meinong (and Priest) leave room for impossible objects (like a mountain made entirely of gold), and even contradictory objects (such as a round square). This would have a property, of 'being a contradictory object'.
Gist of Idea
There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties
Source
report of Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.8
Book Reference
Friend,Michèle: 'Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics' [Acumen 2007], p.159
A Reaction
This view is only possible with a rather lax view of properties. Personally I don't take 'being a pencil' to be a property of a pencil. It might be safer to just say that 'round squares' are possible linguistic subjects of predication.