Full Idea
The adverbial account of the content of experience is almost certainly correct, because no account can be given of the relation between sense-data and the apprehending mind that is independent of the adverbial theory.
Gist of Idea
The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data
Source
Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 5.1 n3)
Book Reference
Bonjour,L/Sosa,E: 'Epistemic Justification' [Blackwells 2003], p.78
A Reaction
This boils down to the usual objection to sense-data, which is 'cut out the middle man'. Bonjour is right that at some point the mind has finally to experience whatever is coming in, and it must experience it in a particular way.