Full Idea
An existential quantification could turn out false when substitutionally construed and true when objectually construed, because of there being objects of the purported kind but only nameless ones.
Gist of Idea
Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects
Source
Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.6)
Book Reference
Quine,Willard: 'Philosophy of Logic' [Prentice-Hall 1970], p.93
A Reaction
(Cf. Idea 9025) Some irrational numbers were his candidates for nameless objects, but as decimals they are infinite in length which seems unfair. I don't take even pi or root-2 to be objects in nature, so not naming irrationals doesn't bother me.
Related Idea
Idea 9025 You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine]