Single Idea 9269

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility]

Full Idea

It is not true that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if his will was free when he did it. He may be morally responsible for having done it even though his will was not free at all.

Gist of Idea

A person may be morally responsible without free will

Source

Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §IV)

Book Reference

'Free Will', ed/tr. Watson,Gary [OUP 1982], p.93


A Reaction

Frankfurt seems to be one of the first to assert this break with the traditional view. Good for him. I take moral responsibility to hinge on an action being caused by a person, but not with a mystical view of what a person is.