Full Idea
The epistemological notion of analyticity: a statement is 'true by virtue of meaning' provided that grasp of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its truth; the metaphysical reading is that it owes its truth to its meaning, not to facts.
Gist of Idea
Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning
Source
Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I)
Book Reference
-: 'Nous' [-], p.3
A Reaction
Kripke thinks it is neither, but is a purely semantic notion. How could grasp of meaning alone be a good justification if it wasn't meaning which was the sole cause of the statement's truth? I'm not convinced by his distinction.
Related Idea
Idea 9383 Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]