Single Idea 12225

[catalogued under 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism]

Full Idea

A third way has been offered to 'make sense' of neo-Fregeanism: we should reject Quine's well-known criterion of ontological commitment in favour of one based on 'truth-maker theory'.


Quine's criterion is that ontology is what is quantified over

Gist of Idea

Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment


B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], 4 n19)

Book Reference

'Metametaphysics', ed/tr. Chalmers/Manley/Wasserman [OUP 2009], p.186

A Reaction

[The cite Ross Cameron for this] They reject this proposal, on the grounds that truth-maker theory is not sufficient to fix the grounding truth-conditions of statements.

Related Idea

Idea 18394 In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong]