Single Idea 12637

[catalogued under 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts]

Full Idea

Philosophers in droves have held that Frege cases are convincing arguments that concepts have not just referents but also senses.

Gist of Idea

Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference


Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.2)

Book Reference

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.56

A Reaction

[Frege cases are puzzles where simple reference seems to lead to confusion] I take the Fregean approach to concepts (of Dummett, Peacocke) to attempt to give an account of the sense, once the reference is decided. Idea 12629 gives Fodor's view.

Related Idea

Idea 12629 For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]