Single Idea 12638

[catalogued under 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts]

Full Idea

How are we to understand the connection between the identity of a concept and its causal powers if concepts are (or have) senses? Answer: I haven't a clue.

Gist of Idea

If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers


Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3)

Book Reference

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.61

A Reaction

This seems to be the key to Fodor's attack on Peacocke and other Fregeans - that while they pay lip-service to the project of naturalising thought, they are actually committing us to some sort of neo-platonism, by losing the causal links. See Idea 12636.

Related Idea

Idea 12636 Mental states have causal powers [Fodor]