Single Idea 12639

[catalogued under 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts]

Full Idea

Supposing the mind to be conversant with senses can, maybe, provide for a theory of the intentionality of mental states; but it seems to shed no light at all on the nature of mental processes (i.e. of mental state transitions).

Gist of Idea

Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes


Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3.3)

Book Reference

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.62

A Reaction

I would track this back to Frege's hostility to 'psychologism'. That is, Fregeans don't care about Fodor's problem, because all their accounts (of mathematics, of logic, and of concepts) treat the subject-matter as self-contained sui generis.