Single Idea 12664

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and]

Full Idea

I'm inclined to think that 'and' is defined by its truth-table (and not, for example, by its 'inferential-role').

Gist of Idea

A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and'


Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.7)

Book Reference

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.199

A Reaction

Sounds right, on my general principle that something can only have a function if it has an intrinsic nature. The truth-table just formalises normal understanding of 'and', according to what it makes true.