Single Idea 13767

[catalogued under 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals]

Full Idea

Grice defended the truth-functional account of conditionals, noting the gap between what we are justified in believing and what is appropriate to say. .But the problem arises at the level of belief, not at the level of inappropriate conversational remarks

Gist of Idea

Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks

Source

comment on H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals 17.1.3

Book Reference

'Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Goble,Lou [Blackwell 2001], p.392


Related Ideas

Idea 13766 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey]

Idea 13769 Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]