Single Idea 16395

[catalogued under 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics]

Full Idea

Kripke's contribution was not to connect metaphysical and semantic issues, but to separate them: to provide a context in which questions about essences of things could be posed independently of assumptions about semantic rules of reference.

Gist of Idea

Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent

Source

report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Reference and Necessity Intro

Book Reference

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.167


A Reaction

In other words, Kripke set metaphysics free from the tyranny of Quine, and facilitated its modern rebirth. Bravo.

Related Idea

Idea 16394 Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]