Full Idea
I reject saying there must be an additional truthmaker for 'Determinately, p': rather, I say that the truthmaker for p must simply be a determinate existent rather than a mere existent.
Gist of Idea
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 6)
Book Reference
'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol.6', ed/tr. Zimmerman,D/Bennett,K [OUP 2011], p.82
A Reaction
As he puts it (quite persuasively), God doesn't need to add an extra truthmaker for a determinate truth. Cameron rejects Necessitarianism. He uses 'determinate' fairly uncritically. What makes the truth of the truthmaker's determinacy?
Related Idea
Idea 18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]