Single Idea 22020

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds]

Full Idea

A rational creature cannot posit itself as such a creature with self-consciousness without positing itself as an individual, as one among many rational creatures.

Gist of Idea

We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities

Source

Johann Fichte (The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed] [1794], p.8), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 05 n25

Book Reference

Pinkard,Terry: 'German Philosophy 1760-1860' [CUP 2002], p.119


A Reaction

[1796 book about his Wissenschaftlehre] This is the transcendental (Kantian) approach to other minds. Wittgenstein's private language argument is similar. Hegel was impressed by this idea (I think).

Related Idea

Idea 22024 Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]