Single Idea 2598

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability]

Full Idea

If one of your reasons for doubting that believing-that-P is a physical property is that believing is multiply realizable, then you have the same reason for doubting that being an airfoil (or a mountain) counts as a physical property.

Gist of Idea

Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be?

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (Making Mind Matter More [1989], p.153)

Book Reference

'The Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Beakley,B /Ludlow P [MIT 1992], p.153


A Reaction

This merely points out that functionalism is not incompatible with physicalism, which must be right.