Single Idea 3404

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism]

Full Idea

Davidson's thesis is that if mental events of a particular kind cause physical events of a particular kind, and the two kinds are connected by a law, then they must both be physical kinds.

Gist of Idea

Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible


report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.137

Book Reference

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.137

A Reaction

Davidson would pretty obviously be right. The whole problem here is the idea of a 'law'. You can only have strict law for simple entities, like particles and natural kinds. The brain is a mess, like weather or explosions.