Single Idea 3429

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability]

Full Idea

Davidson's argument about psychophysical anomalism has not been embraced by everyone; multiple realisability of mental properties has had a much greater impact in undermining reductionism (and hence type physicalism).


[Because it made the identity of a thought with a type of substance impossible]

Gist of Idea

Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was


report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.218

Book Reference

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.218

A Reaction

My view is that functional states are multiply realisable, but phenomenal states aren't. Fear functions in frogs much as it does in us, but being a frightened frog is nothing like being a frightened human. Their brains are different!