Single Idea 5832

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument]

Full Idea

The identity theorist, it appears, can admit that the identity is necessary if true without substantially altering his position, but Kripke argues that the identity between pain and some brain states is not necessary.

Gist of Idea

Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical


report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3) by Stephen P. Schwartz - Intro to Naming,Necessity and Natural Kinds žIV

Book Reference

'Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds', ed/tr. Schwartz,Stephen P. [Cornell 1979], p.35

A Reaction

This appears to depend on being able to imagine the pain occurring with a different brain state, or no brain state. Bad argument. See Idea 5819.

Related Idea

Idea 5819 Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam]