Single Idea 6385

[catalogued under 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will]

Full Idea

I defend my causal view of action by arguing that a reason that is causally strongest need not be a reason deemed by the actor to provide the strongest (best) grounds for acting.

Gist of Idea

The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best


Donald Davidson (Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events' [1980], p.xii)

Book Reference

Davidson,Donald: 'Essays on Actions and Events' [OUP 1982], p.-5

A Reaction

If I smoke a cigarette against my better judgement, it is not clear to me how the desire to smoke it, which overcomes my judgement not to smoke it, counts as the causally strongest 'reason'. We seem to have two different senses of 'reason' here.