Single Idea 7002

[catalogued under 19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds]

Full Idea

When pressed, philosophers will describe propositions as states of affairs or sets of possible worlds. But wait! Neither sets of possible worlds nor states of affairs - electrons being negatively charged, for instance - have truth values.

Gist of Idea

If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values


John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], Intro)

Book Reference

Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.10

A Reaction

I'm not sure that I see a problem. A pure proposition, expressed as, say "there is a giraffe on the roof" only acquires a truth value at the point where you assert it or believe it. There IS a possible world where there is a giraffe on the roof.