Single Idea 7064

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies]

Full Idea

Functionalists deny that zombies are possible since states of mind (including conscious states) are purely functional states. If two agents are in the same functional state, regardless of qualitative difference, they are in the same mental state.

Gist of Idea

Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state


John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 20.5)

Book Reference

Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.247

A Reaction

In its 'brief' form this idea begins to smell of tautology. Only the right sort of functional state would entail a mental state, and how else can that functional state be defined, apart from its leading to a mental state?