Single Idea 7882

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain]

Full Idea

It is a mistake to suppose that research into phenomenal consciousness can proceed just like other kinds of scientific research. Phenomenal concepts are peculiar, and some of the questions they pose for empirical investigation are peculiar too.

Gist of Idea

Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar

Source

David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.01)

Book Reference

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.176


A Reaction

This arises from Papineau's Conceptual Dualism, that our concepts are deeply dualist, when the underlying ontology is not. Brain researchers are wise to ignore phenomenology, and creep slowly forward from the physical end, where the concepts are clear.